Garfinkel's appeal to a natural attitude draws from Edmund Husserl's phenomenology.
its being right and correct, i.e., morally proper that it be that way" (123) . And he talks about penises and vaginas seen by the normal as "legitimate possessions" to which males and females respectively have moral entitlements (127). In effect, the natural attitude about the metaphysics of sex is also a view about a moral order.
This notion is useful in understanding a kind of transphobia thoroughly imbued with both moral and metaphysical considerations. It isn't uncommon for a trans person to be represented as "really a so and so, disguised as a such and such." A trans woman, for example, may be represented as engaging in a kind of "sexual deception."<1> Ironically, while such "deceivers" are held accountable for misrepresentation, they're subjected to an often unacknowledged sexual violence (genital verification to determine sex). Thus, while trans people may find our identities overtly invalidated through moral accusation, we may also be subjected to covert sexual violence within a framework juxtaposing appearance and reality.
My aim in this paper is to look beneath the natural attitude in order to explain its peculiar resilience and oppressive force. There we will find a moral order based in dichotomously sexed bodies so constituted through boundaries governing privacy and decency. In particular, naked bodies are sex-differentiated within a system of genital representation through gender presentation -a system which helps constitute the very line between public and private.
In this account, personhood is defined through such boundaries. While the boundaries are conventional, they're grounded in the legitimate demands of intimacy. This means violations of the person can constitute veritable moral wrongs despite the fact they're instituted in (hetero) sexist and transphobic ways. Resistance to the moral order involves far more than merely a change in belief. It involves the re-negotiation of the moral boundaries involved in the constitution of the sexed body and personhood itself.
To be clear, I take this system of interpersonal boundaries to be both culturally and historically relative (like the natural attitude). I'll speak, quite roughly, of "Eurocentered culture" to refer to dominant cultural forms of life situated in a U.S./European-centered context of the present-day. This doesn't mean other cultures don't have boundary systems which overlap with the one I describe (and which consequently sustain transphobia). But I'm interested in describing a system of intimacy with a specific history of colonialism. One of my goals is to elucidate some of the ways this particular system institutes, as part of the moral fabric, a multiply oppressive (transphobic, sexist, homophobic, racist, ablest) construct of intimate personhood. In doing so, I
recognize multiple subcultures, even within the U.S., for example, with alternative, resistant systems.
Let me also disclose that I write this paper as a white, anglo transgender woman situated in Los Angeles within several intersecting trans, lesbian, and other resistant subcultures. It's in part because I'm able to see the dominant system from resistant places that I'm able to outline it at all. At any rate, my vision of the system is informed and limited by these several cultural vantage points. Since the project is geared primarily to understanding transphobia, there'll inevitably be distortions caused by that focus (as opposed to another). Suffice it to say, I offer this account as a socially-located contribution intended to be situated within a larger dialogue.
The Social Construction of Nakedness
One way a body can be viewed as "socially constructed" concerns its constitution as "naked." My view is not merely that a naked human body can have different cultural meanings assigned to its nakedness. Rather, my view is that nakedness itself is a specific construct. Infants aren't born wearing clothing; they're covered-up with culturally designed artifacts by other human beings. That's a social practice. But naked is defined relative to clothed. Without the concept of being clothed, there could be no concept of nakedness. And without the social possibility of being clothed, there could be no corresponding social possibility of being naked.
In a culture lacking the concept of nakedness and the practice of body-concealment, one might very well describe the members as "naked." But this stands in contrast with the way members of a culture can be naked or not precisely because there's a social practice of wearing clothing: Here, nakedness is a well-defined (socially constituted) modality of self-presentation, contrasting with other modalities of self-presentation.
Nor should one believe the social practice of wearing clothing has any "natural" grounding." In addition to the existence of nudist subculture, there have been many cultures in which bodily-concealment was not a salient social practice (for example, among aboriginal peoples).<2> To be sure, the phenomenon of bodily adornment seems fairly ubiquitous<3> and how one defines nakedness is a tricky business.<4> Yet the fact remains that such bodilyconcealment isn't universal. Aboriginal scholar, Irene Watson writes, for example:
There are no words that I have come across in our indigenous languages to describe nakedness. Prior to the colonists' invasion of our territories there was no reflection of our nakedness. The reflection of nakedness came with the other, the clothed colonising peoples. Now there are few who physically walk the land naked (Watson 2).
In Eurocentered culture, the social possibilities of being naked and clothed are bound with issues of morality, privacy, decency, and violation.<5> To help describe this, I distinguish between the morally and materially private.<6> The former involves a claim about the moral status of a body part, the latter a claim about whether a body part is in fact private (in the sense of being concealed from sight). In this latter sense, someone who "streaks" across the field has parts that aren't materially private. Regardless, they're morally private insofar as exposure draws down moral concern.
In Eurocentered culture, the moral privacy of body parts is partially constitutive of the social phenomenon of nakedness. In particular, the moral privacy of these parts undergirds the social practice of concealing them; it does so by referencing the moral consequences of nakedness. Because of the moral consequences of displaying one's privates, one conceals them in public. Not only does the social possibility of being clothed yield the social possibility of nakedness, the very practice of wearing clothes is motivated by reference to the possibility of nakedness as a moral phenomenon: We cannot separate the social phenomenon of nakedness from the status certain body parts as morally private. That is: In Eurocentered culture, nakedness, insofar as it connects meaningfully to social practices, is thoroughly invested with moral meaning.
Boundaries and People
In saying body parts are "morally private" I mean they're "morally bounded" with respect to the sensory access of another. I take these "moral boundaries" to have two-sides (one regulating the subject of perceptual access, one regulating the object). In Eurocentered culture, one way to transgress a boundary is to look at a person's privates without their consent. Here, there's a privacy violation and a violation of the object. However, it's also appropriate to speak of decency violations and violations of the subject. This is typified when an individual inappropriately shares personal information. Another might say, "TMI!" (That's "Too Much Information"!). The boundary is transgressed by providing information that the subject has the right not to know.<7> Similarly, one might show too much of one's body to another. Indeed, if a person deliberately exposes himself to another, this counts as a violation, in Eurocentered culture. It's why, in part, there're laws against public indecency.
So even though these boundaries inhere in individuals' bodies, they're interpersonal boundaries drawing moral lines between people. That is, these boundaries are shared boundaries, they don't merely bound us, they bound others. And in most traditional face-to-face human interactions both parties are perceiving objects and subjects. This means there're two (doubledsided) boundaries in play.
This affords a way to understand why privacy and decency violations can be violations of the person herself. We can allow a sense in which a person is delimited by her interpersonal boundaries, just as countries are delimited by the boundaries which separate them. In this sense, a person is defined by her interpersonal boundaries: To violate a person is to transgress a boundary which delimits her.
In saying this, caution is required. I don't wish to advance a general account of personhood. Philosophers use person in different ways and much depends on how. In this paper, I'm interested in an understanding of person as mediated through our various relations to people.
People we actually encounter in life are experienced through various interpersonal interactions which admit of varying degrees of intimacy. I want to avoid abstracting a notion of person from such relations. Rather, the sense of person that concerns me is brought out in one of the OED's definitions of intimate: "proceeding from, concerning, or affecting one' s inmost self; closely personal."<8> My claim is that what I call the intimate person is delimited in terms of interpersonal boundaries.
In one sense, intimate can apply to particular features of an individual person; it may be used as a synonym for private or personal. In another, it can pertain to relations between people.
According to an OED definition, intimate means "close in acquaintance or association; closely connected by friendship or personal knowledge; characterized by familiarity (with a person or thing); very familiar." And intimacy is defined as "the state of being personally intimate; intimate friendship or acquaintance; familiar intercourse; close familiarity." The key notions are closeness and familiarity.<9>
The notion of closeness suggests a spatial metaphor; we might think of a kind of interpersonal "distance" or "proximity." One obvious way of illuminating this is in terms epistemological familiarity. Emotional closeness involves sharing biographical information, with a significant emphasis on one's affective attitudes. Physical closeness involves an increased sensory access to one another (visual access, touching, or at least an increased literal physical closeness). In general, intimacy can be understood in terms of mutual informational and/or sensory access to one another. This suggests intimacy between people is a matter of degree. While this is somewhat true, however, we shouldn't ignore the polarity between notions of interpersonal distance and closeness. Intimacy marks a divide between types of interpersonal relations. Intimacy is suggestive of a kind of boundary-traversing familiarity (not just familiar, very familiar). This bounded quality is required for intimacy. Without it, we'd merely have degrees of familiarity.
But the bounded nature of intimacy is made possible precisely by the interpersonal boundaries we've been discussing.<10> Certain parts of the body are subject to boundaries on sensory access. Actual spatial distance between people is subject to a boundary. Biographical information, particularly attitudinal in natural, is subject to a boundary. Things are bounded as "personal" precisely because they're constitutively allocated to intimate relations. That is:
They're required to constitute intimate relations as intimate. Interpersonal boundaries "separate" individuals with regard to sensory and informational access. Such boundaries exist so they may be, under appropriate conditions, mutually traversed. In effect, intimacy is made possible by interpersonal boundaries which delimit people. These people are thereby constituted as fit candidates for intimacy -people who are capable of close, moderate, and distant relations with each other.<11> As a condition of this, they're constituted as susceptible to being violated by and to violating others. In effect, intimate personhood is profoundly moral in nature.<12> I see the intimate body as playing a foundation role in the constitution of the intimate person. Admittedly, the intimate person is determined by boundaries besides those which govern sensory access to bodies. In particular, there are boundaries governing the exchange of biographical information (particularly information about affective state). However, it still seems that the moral privacy of the body is in some ways basic. Boundaries on the intimate body regulate sensory-access rather than discourse; how we literally experience each other seems more fundamental than boundaries on what we say about each other. Indeed, much information that is subject to boundary precisely concerns the bounded body or its activities.
This conception of the intimate body and person is useful in illuminating how a moral order can be conventional and yet binding. One example is precisely the relativity of nakedness 
Moral Structures and the Body
The human body possesses a moral structure determined by interpersonal boundaries.
The most obvious example is the fact that in Eurocentered culture, while certain parts (genitalia) have boundaries on visual access, other parts (face and hands) do not. Because the face and hands are characterized by a lack of boundary on visual access, their lack of material concealment can't contribute to a body's nakedness. (Of course, this is clearly a culturally relative moral structure -as is born out, for example, by the use of the burqa in some Muslim contexts.<13> This suggests ways religion can be implicated within various systems of intimacy as well as how a dominant Western Eurocentered system of intimacy may be shaped by an internally invisible Christian-normativity).
While other parts are morally bounded, they aren't bounded to the same degree. While buttocks are culturally coded as private, in Eurocentered culture, they aren't as private as genitalia. Additionally, parts which aren't morally private are nonetheless bounded in other ways -such as sheer "social inappropriateness": One can be almost naked on the beach, while one could never wear a swimsuit to church. All of this is subject to regulations of decorum. And this is of a piece with the regulation of bodily access through sensory modalities.
The body, then, has a moral structure determined by what's bounded, how it's bounded, to what degree it's bounded, and why it's bounded. In Eurocentric culture, the bounding of genitalia occurs within the context of a larger structure of boundaries. Yet, while genitalia are "outstripped" by a larger structure, they also play a central role. First, there's a vague order reflected in the overall moral structure of the body with regard to the movement from being clothed to being naked. While merely exposed genitalia do not constitute nakedness as such, this exposure constitutes the "last stage" thereof or the completion of nakedness.<14> Second, genitalia are morally decisive with respect to nakedness. Insofar as nakedness is a moral concept, questions about whether a person is naked are answered in terms of genitalia. In the Eurocentered system, genitalia are fundamental to the moral structure of the intimate body. To capture this, I say that genitalia "morally complete" a body.
The structure of an intimate body, in Eurocentered culture, is fundamentally gendered.
Boundaries on genitalia are linked to a particular kind of physical/sexual intimacy (coitus). In effect, one main reason genitalia are morally delimited at all is to allocate them constitutively to a kind of physical intimacy. Within a (hetero) sexist context, coitus occupies a decisive location within the multiple possibilities of sexual interaction. It's that towards which all other sexual activities tend. This is reflected in the heterosexist and transphobic way in which laws against acts of sexual violence may define rape, the most culturally recognized and canonical form of boundary violation, strictly in terms of coitus (using categories such as sodomy to capture other forms of sexual violence).<15> Not only are bodies divided according to two types of genitalia, these divided bodies are subject to differential structures. One example of this is the fact that a female structure involves two-tiered nakedness: The female chest is subject to a boundary that the male chest is not. This provides for the possibility of female "toplessness" and "bottomless" and hence affords nakedness twice over.
This difference in structure is reflected in the way the boundaries work. Rape is canonically conceptualized "male-to-female." One reason for this concerns the constitution of male genitalia as violating and female genitalia as violated. This is reflected in cultural ideology that sex with men harms or "dirties" women -an ideology that continues to have consequences.
While women are no longer necessarily valued for purity in Eurocentered culture, it remains true, in certain cultural contexts, that a woman who has "too much sex" or sex "with the wrong people" or "in the wrong circumstances" will be subject to social sanction in a way that a man will not. I believe this is because sexual intercourse continues to be viewed as a boundary violation (and a violation of the women herself), regardless of her consent. I see such boundaries as prior to consent and motivational with regard to it. Hence, in order to avoid a "pre-consensual" boundary violation, a woman may avoid certain activities.
Such "pre-consensual boundaries" constitutively allocate a woman's sexuality to particular "elevated" relations of intimacy that can then "clean" the sex of its capacity for boundary violation. The fact that marriage is no longer required as the "elevated" relation of intimacy doesn't mean such an asymmetrical system doesn't, to some extent, remain in play.
This type of asymmetry is also manifested in privacy/decency violations. It may be that a man viewing the naked body of a woman, in the absence of legitimating conditions, constitutes a "pre-consensual" violation of her privacy (and hence, of her). By contrast, it doesn't seem to be that a woman viewing the naked body of man, in the absence of legitimating conditions, constitutes a "pre-consensual" violation of his privacy. On the contrary, exposure of his body constitutes a "pre-consensual" decency violation (and hence a violation of her). If so, there's an asymmetry in motivation for concealment in the presence of the "opposite sex": A female will cover-up to protect her privacy. A male will cover-up to prevent his body from offending through indecency. <16> While this claim is no doubt overly simplified, it helps explain the underlying gender segregation of public restrooms, showers, and changing rooms, as well as segregation in congregate housing and strip search requirements (police officers of the same-sex as the detainee). One reason for segregating public showers is that pre-consensual boundaries restrict visual access between males and females. Presumably, this is because such intimate visual access is constitutively allocated to coitus and the path that leads there.
And there does seem to be an asymmetry. Consider Paul Scott, a Michigan state representative and a GOP candidate for Secretary of State, who recently identified one of his top four priorities as ensuring that "transgender individuals will not be allowed to change the sex on their driver's license in any circumstance" (Heywood 2010) . He explains the mandate was about "preventing people who are males genetically from dressing as a woman and going into female bathrooms." Gary Glenn, leader of the American Family Association of Michigan, elaborates "I think there are all kinds of implications to the privacy rights of women and children if biological males are given access to health clubs, showers, locker rooms and changing areas" (Harger 2010 ). The worry is that "biological males" will violate the privacy of females simply by seeing them, not the other way around. This formulation is no accident.
Here we find more ways a conventional order can be both morally binding and subject to critique. The constitution of privacy/decency boundaries yields a situation in which a woman can be violated either through seeing or being seen by a man. The sexist nature of the order doesn't change the fact that violations of these boundaries constitute veritable moral wrongs. In this way, the moral order possesses an ambiguous character: On the one hand, it's oppressive; on the other hand, it's real. This is made possible by the fact that relations of intimacy require interpersonal boundaries to constitute intimate persons, but leave how those boundaries are drawn entirely open.
The Meaning of Gender Presentation
In Eurocentered culture, a person's genital status is socially constituted as an important moral fact. Since coitus is recognized as the "completion" of sexual intimacy, it'll seem important to know in advance "who has what" in aiming for it, avoiding it, and regulating it (through various forms of segregation). Yet, genitals are generally materially private.
Perhaps there're enough differences in morphological features (such as height, musclemass and fat distribution, bone-width, Adam's apple, voice pitch, etc.) to serve as evidence for hypotheses about genitalia. To me, such a suggestion significantly underestimates the degree of cultural work needed to ensure we can tell the sexes apart. Moreover, since the private body is concealed by cultural artifacts, there's already cultural work afoot. That this work doesn't deemphasize differences is necessitated by the fact the morally private body is dichotomized in socially relevant ways.
To better understand this cultural work, I take "presentation" to be a presentation of one's embodied self to another. It includes attire, grooming, adornment, bodily gesture, posture, manner of speech, and socially-interactive style. Given such presentation is genderdifferentiated, I speak of "gender presentation." Obviously, much gender presentation is conventional and arbitrary in nature.
Consequently, gender presentation bears some analogy to human languages (in which arbitrary and culturally variable symbols are assigned to objects). Moreover, behavior in accord with a norm may provide evidence about genital status (just like certain morphological features do). But the fact that the behavior provides evidence of genital status does not establish the behavior is literally communicative and representational. The follow argument does.
In light of the social salience of genital status in Eurocentered culture, it seems like good fortune that normed behavior should provide evidence for it. Indeed, not only is the status socially salient, it's been socially "privatized." So that there's a need to know in the first place is a consequence of social facts. It's a remarkable coincidence, then, that socially-regulated gender presentation should provide evidence for a socially-relevant fact that's been, owing to further social facts, hidden from public sight. Or else it's one of the actual social functions of gender presentation to relay this information. The latter is the best explanation.
And an argument can be given which provides greater detail to that explanation. Certain expressions are restricted according to social appropriateness where analogous words serve as euphemistic replacements. For example, fudge stands in for fuck. Notably, transphobic discourse frequently traffics in euphemisms. One example is the question "Have you had the surgery?" This question is often a way of asking "Do you have a penis or a vagina?" Since it's socially inappropriate to pose such a question to a complete stranger (or even to someone you know, in most circumstances), a "coded" form of discourse is used.
There are interesting variants on this euphemism involving the terms man/woman and male/female. The question "Are you a man or a woman?" is often used to euphemistically ask about a person's genitals. And we find this kind of euphemism in transphobic representations of a trans person as "really a so and so, disguised as a such and such." Consider the phrases "turned out to be really a man", "living as a woman, although biologically male," and "discovered to be anatomically male." While most expressions like this needn't be used as euphemistic claims about genitalia, they frequently are. But if gender presentation literally communicates information about genitalia, in Eurocentered culture, it must do so in a euphemistic way, since outright discussion of genitalia is restricted. That helps explain how gender presentation could serve this communicative function without being obvious. It also elucidates my claim that gender presentation literally represents genital status: Gender presentation euphemistically replaces naked declarations about genital status.
In my view, however, gender presentation isn't merely a euphemism for restricted discourse about genitalia, it's a euphemistic stand-in for genitals per se. As I argued earlier, nakedness is constituted as a distinctive mode of presentation in Eurocentered culture: We can say, crudely, that there're two modes of self-presentation (naked/clothed). And nakedpresentation, like clothed-presentation, is fundamentally informational since it's the locus of a socially salient distinction which is, nonetheless, hidden. Since this display of the information is restricted, however, clothed-presentation serves as its euphemistic replacement (just as it replaces naked declarations about genital status). And since naked and clothed-presentation are the two primary, interrelated sensory modes of (informational) self-presentation, the one is more properly a replacement of the other (rather than, say, the various discursive locutions about genital status).
As the euphemistic replacement of naked-presentation, clothed-presentation effectively references that which it replaces as darn points to damn: A referential structure is instituted whereby female and male modes of nakedness are replaced by female and male modes of clothed presentation respectively. While naked and clothed presentations are on the same footing as social modes of self-presentation, the former assumes the fundamentality of referent. And because the referential structure is constituted through a contrast between euphemistic and dysphemistic display, there's a gap between signifier and signified -a barrier between private and public presentations. In this way, the referential structure and the restrictions/allowances on self-presentation are co-constituting within this system of intimacy: It's through being the referent of clothed-presentation that genitalia become morally private.
And this illuminates the central thesis of the natural attitude: Natural sex exists independently of social interactions. As the referent of clothed-presentation, the sexed body appears independent of social interactions, so display of naked body becomes display of the thing itself or the hidden truth. <17> While naked-presentation is informational, it's a raw display of the bodily truth or reality. And what gets obscured is that it's a distinctive, morally infused and regulated, modality of self-presentation, rather than some pre-cultural state. <18> By contrast, clothed-presentation seems secondary and cultural. It becomes a mere appearance which projects a hidden reality: While the naked body isn't available to sight, it's there, somehow, entirely naked. But one doesn't see the naked body (since the body isn't naked); rather clothed-presentation merely suggests a certain possibility of a naked presentation. That is: The presence of the body as naked is an illusion created by the referential structure. The naked body is hidden yet suggested in clothed-presentation as the stronger damn is hidden yet suggested in darn. But what is truly hidden, once again, is the socially constituted status of naked-presentation as moral phenomenon.
Clearly, the transphobic representation of a trans person as "really an x, distiguised as a y" derives from the perceived incongruence between (clothed) gender presentation (qua appearance) and the sexed body (qua reality): Because the relation is representational, trans people are read as "deceivers" who falsely project the wrong (naked) body. And because genitalia are systematically (euphemistically) communicated on a regular basis, it's no surprise trans people are then subject to forced genital verification to determine real sex (where that status is fundamentally moral in nature): When the euphemistic display of genital information has failed, naked-presentation (or, rather, forced exposure) gives the final, brutal, verdict about the gendered truth.
The Natural Attitude Revisited
In my account, genitalia are viewed as essential to sex-determination in the natural attitude because they're distinct from all other features with regard to nakedness: They're the completion of the naked body and the locus of moral boundaries between people. Other features such as karyotype don't fall within the purview of nakedness, are not subject to the same boundaries. Breasts do fall within the purview, but don't possess the same fundamental status.
Moreover, genitalia as definitive with regard to sex-differentiated moral structures, are the symbolic referents of gender presentation. As the symbolic referents, genitalia are unique as that which is communicated through gender presentation. They constitute the hidden truth of gender.
As the hidden truth and the moral completion of nakedness, genitalia are the locus of a metaphysical/moral blending.
It's also clear why the natural attitude expects people to be exclusively male or female.
Penises and vaginas complete differential moral structures of the intimate body. The structures of intimate males and females themselves are contrasting and reciprocal. This requires sharply contrasting (clothed) gender presentation. Indeed, one can argue that the very referential system through which the intimate boundaries are constituted requires a binary: Without the possibility of misrepresentation, there could be no possibility of correct representation.
Similarly, it's clear why this distinction should apply exhaustively to people. Since the boundaries which morally differentiate people are fundamentally dichotomized, it becomes impossible for somebody to count as an intimate person without belonging to a sex. Again:
Insofar as all presentation is gender dichotomized, it becomes impossible for a person to present without being assessed as gender presenting.
The account explains why only "ceremonial transfers" from one sex to the other are countenanced. Initially perplexing is how something like a masquerade can constitute a ceremonial transfer with regard to genital status. The answer is that gender presentation is a sign of genitalia -it refers to genitalia qua moral completion of nakedness. Indeed, gender presentation as genital representation is involved in the very constitution of nakedness as the hidden truth.
In this view, the social acceptance of ceremonial transfers is explained through the thesis that there can be no representation without the possibility of misrepresentation. Ceremonial transfers are the social acknowledgement of the possibility of misrepresentation. And as such, these occasions do serious cultural work in inscribing gender presentation as representational.
Unregulated and wide-spread misrepresentation would threaten to undermine the very correlation between gender presentation and genital status, and hence its representational function. So transfers need to be recognized while locally contained. It's little surprise, therefore, that accusations of deception (along with forced genital exposure) are used not merely to "expose the truth" but to literally re-inscribe the representational nature of gender presentation and thereby re-affirm a particular system of intimate boundaries.
Finally, this account helps explain the thesis that sex is invariant. According to Garfinkel, normals are typically interested in the actual genitalia that "nature" has provided. However, in tough cases they appeal to genitalia to which one is entitled. We can see how this works:
Consider a (non-trans) man who has lost his penis in an accident. He'll still seem to be intimately male (that is, his body is taken to have a male moral structure). And this can easily generate the claim that he ought to have a penis since that body-part is the moral completion of the particular moral structure which constitutes his intimate personhood. The structure itself is taken as invariant because it determines his very personhood. And genitalia, although not physically invariant, are "structurally invariant" insofar as they "morally complete" a particular moral structure.
This explains why a trans person who undergoes genital reconstruction surgery may continue to be viewed as "really an x, pretending to be a y." In another essay, I argued that there's still a "misalignment" between gender presentation and genitalia. In such cases, the invariance of sex and the essentiality of genitalia are secured by the ad hoc stipulation that sex is determined by "birth genitalia" and by the representation of vagina as "artificial" (2007, 7) . To this I will now add: The trans woman's body is taken as intimately male. So her vagina is seen as illegitimate, in part, because it's not the completion of the moral structure of her body. In this case, the trans woman has not only "misrepresented" the structure of her body, she's "misrepresented" the genitalia to which she's entitled and which is the moral completion of that structure.
Notably, when a trans woman is assigned an intimate male structure and her actual body looks female, serious tensions arise. What moral status do her breasts and vagina have, if she's taken to be intimately male? There's no difficulty viewing her as male when it comes to her as a viewing subject. Because she's read as intimately male, she'll be taken to possess the capacity to "pre-consensually" violate a woman's privacy, and consequently her presence in the women's restroom will raise moral alarm. However, the moral status of breasts and vagina is less clear.
This incongruity between body-part and perceived boundary may be what motivates the view that she's "sick" or "monstrous." It may also mean her breasts and vagina will not be subject to female boundaries (especially in private). This would mean touching her breasts inappropriately would not count as a (female) boundary violation in the natural attitude. It would also mean she could not, technically speaking, ever be raped.<19> Of course, from the perspective of the woman herself, such boundaries would be in place. But to a "normal" that might mean very little.
This also helps explain the historically extreme transphobic attitudes of some (non trans) feminists. For while there may be room for political discussion about women's/ womyn's space, for example, Raymond's hurtful claim that all transsexual lesbians effectively rape women by entering their space is beyond the pale (1979, 104) . The allegation is grounded in the view that transsexual lesbians are "really men" (i.e., intimately male) and therefore capable of violating intimate females by intruding upon their privacy. Consider Raymond's remark Transsexuals merely cut off the most obvious means of invading women so that they seem noninvasive. However, as Mary Daly has remarked, in the case of the transexually constructed lesbian-feminists their whole presence becomes a "member" invading women's space . . . (1979, 104) . The accusation is not so different from fairly standard (transphobic) concerns around women's privacy (e.g., restroom use). And when Raymond claims "all transsexuals rape women's bodies by reducing the real female form to artifact, appropriating this body for themselves" (104) it may be that the incongruity of a (perceived) male moral structure with a materially female body is read by her as a kind of monstrous rape. If so, Raymond's feminist view is ironically dependent upon the highly (hetero) sexist system of intimacy which lies at the basis of the natural attitude about sex.
Thinking Resistance
Given specific interpersonal boundaries are conventional, there's a sense in which intimate personhood must be viewed as socially conferred. Indeed, one can see how intimate personhood might not be conferred at all to some human beings (in, say, the case of colonial and racist deployments of power). For example, Eurcentered racist representations of some humans as "primitive" or even "animal" can serve the function of denying that such bodies are morally private as a way to justify abusive practices.<20> Insofar as intimate personhood is essentially gendered in this system, such a denial would place racialized people outside the bounds of the gendered moral order. It would also yield the odd consequence that humans denied such boundaries cannot be violated, and perhaps can't be intimate persons at all. The consequence is perverse. And it questions the adequacy of my account, since this is an apparent consequence.
One answer is that those who are oppressed tend to inhabit a plurality of cultural "worlds."<21> This means that while a human may be constituted as one kind of intimate person in one "world" (or perhaps not a person at all), she may be constituted as different kind of intimate person in another. Thus, while a trans woman may be constituted as intimately male (and hence invulnerable to violations of the intimate female) in the mainstream "world", she may be constituted otherwise in a trans-friendlier subaltern "world."
Another answer is that the oppressive "world" itself can deploy contradictory representations of those it oppresses.<22> For example, it seems more accurate to say racist and colonial ideology established "liminal" or "ambiguous" boundaries (rather than outright denying intimate personhood) to racialized people, so that it could genuinely abuse while denying the abuse. This means racialized people were partially and therefore differentially situated within the gendered moral order. Similarly, while incarcerated trans women who "have not had the surgery" may be sent to a men's prison (because they are "really men"), they're then especially vulnerable to "rape" (or whatever we decide to call it) while in prison because they're trans women.<23> The reality, as many trans women know, is that we're both un-rapable (because "intimately male") and entirely rapable (because "ceremonially female").
At any rate, trans people are partially "outside" of a particular Eurocentered system of sex-differentiated intimacy. And trans resistance can be understood, in part, as a contestation of the boundaries which constitute intimate personhood. Consider that trans bodily dysphoria often concerns morally private parts, which play a role in sex-differentiated structures of the intimate body. Insofar as these parts are loci for interpersonal boundaries delimiting intimate personhood, the phenomenology of the (sexed) body is necessarily a phenomenology of the (gendered) person. In part, then, bodily dysphoria can involve unhappiness with the socially conferred interpersonal boundaries and a desire to re-negotiate them.
Or consider gender presentation. In my account, while it doesn't literally modify the body, it has the capacity to symbolically confer a sexed body that is "visibly" present "under one's clothes." Given the role of the intimate body in the boundaries which delimit intimate personhood, gender presentation can be understood not only as a technology of the body, but a technology of intimate personhood. That is: It can be used as a way to re-draw one's interpersonal boundaries. Indeed, there's the possibility of undermining the very capacity of gender presentation to communicate genital status at all. This is already part of the actual gender practice in certain trans-friendly subaltern contexts, and it seems to reflect the way in which (some) trans people literally "opt out" of the mandatory system of genital disclosure (Bettcher, 2009 ). This clearly involves a radical reconfiguration of interpersonal boundaries and therefore intimate personhood itself. But it's what's required, I believe, when one is at odds with the moral and metaphysical order itself: One needs -we need -new kinds of self, new modalities of intimacy, in order to exist. Notes I wish to thank Kathryn Hill for her invaluable work as my research assistant. The combination of her effort and talent significantly enriched this essay (and other research hopefully to follow).
As always, I express deep gratitude to Susan Forrest for her insights and loving provocations.
1. For more details, see Bettcher (2007) .
2. Barcan 138, 3. Nagel 16 4. Barcan 16, 284 5. They're also bound up with notions of dignity and shame, but that's beyond this current discussion.
6. While my account has implications for the right to privacy it's neither my goal to provide an account nor to engage with the literature on that topic. My discussion is mostly limited to privacy over bodily-access (as opposed to privacy over informational access or decisional privacy).
7. See Nagel for an interesting discussion.
8. In this paper, I remain neutral on whether person applies cross-culturally/historically.
To be sure, it's important to avoid ethnocentric assumptions about what a person is and whether any one single notion applies universally. The other danger, however, is to restrict personhood to a culture and then deny personhood to other humans (see p. 22 above). In my use of person, the empirical question is whether boundary-grounded intimacy is trans-cultural. It's enough for my argument to note that many cultures possess relational, bounded intimacy as a social possibility and that the boundary systems in these cultures differ significantly.
9. I characterize intimacy independently of love. To be sure, intimacy and love are closely associated (largely because people equate intimacy with emotional intimacy). However, we must also square with physical intimacy. And emotional intimacy needn't involve love.
Consider the possibility of intimate partner violence which presupposes an intimacy, while rendering problematic the application of the word "love." The latter may well be used by an abuser ("I hit you because I love you"), but its applicability is highly doubtful.
10. This is hardly the first attempt to understand the value of privacy in terms of intimacy. This may be the first account to see moral privacy as constitutively required from intimacy (where intimacy is understood in terms of interpersonal "proximity"). For other accounts see Fried (1970) ; Rachels (1975); Gerstein (1978); Innes (1992) .
